Batson v. Kentucky: Peremptory Challenges Redefined by Ball, Mitzi Grove
Denver Law Review 
Volume 64 Issue 3 Article 6 
February 2021 
Batson v. Kentucky: Peremptory Challenges Redefined 
Mitzi Grove Ball 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Mitzi Grove Ball, Batson v. Kentucky: Peremptory Challenges Redefined, 64 Denv. U. L. Rev. 579 (1988). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
BATSON V. KENTUCKY: PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES REDEFINED
I. INTRODUCTION
Racial discrimination in the selection of representative juries' is an
issue that has plagued the courts for over one hundred years. Each step
of the jury selection process 2 has been examined and litigated. 3 Attack
on the racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges, how-
ever, has afforded little relief.4 Consequently, prosecutorial exercise of
peremptory challenges to remove non-white members of the panel often
purposefully results in the selection of an all-white jury to determine the
guilt or innocence of a non-white defendant. 5 This practice finally
prompted the Supreme Court, in Batson v. Kentucky, 6 to attempt to create
a valid curb on the racial abuse of the use of peremptory challenges.
This article first examines the history of the peremptory challenge,
including discussions of the development of both the equal protec-
tion/due process analysis 7 and the sixth amendment/fair cross-section
1. The term "representative jury" indicates that the prospective jurors were sum-
moned in accordance with a racially neutral process. See Note, Peremptory Challenge - System-
atic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157, 159-60 (1967)
[hereinafter Peremptory Challenges - Systematic Exclusion] (racial neutrality in the jury selection
process). Other meanings, however, are given to the term "representative jury;" see, e.g.,
Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE LJ. 1177 (1980),
(equating a representative jury with a petit jury chosen from an array that contains a repre-
sentative cross-section of the community); see also infra notes 61-111 and accompanying
text.
2. The jury selection process includes several stages.
First, a list of eligible jurors is compiled by means of voter registration lists, direc-
tories, a key-man system, or similar methods. From that pool, a venire is ran-
domly selected for service during a particular court term. After excuses for
hardship, health, or similar reasons, the venire is examined and challenges are
made. The petit jury is selected from those jurors who remain.
Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Represen-
tation, 41 Mn. L. REV. 337, 339 n. ll (1982).
3. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 400 U.S. 316 (1942); Carter
v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900) (challenges to discriminatory selection procedures in
grand jury selection); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 545 (1967); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880) (challenges to discriminatory procedures in selecting the jury venire);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Patton v.
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1881); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (challenges to discriminatory
procedures in selection of the petit jury).
4. Swain v. Alabama was the first case in which the United States Supreme Court
examined a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Since that 1964
decision, few defendants have been successful in challenging discriminatory procedures in
selecting the jury panel. See infra notes 34-36 and 87-111 and accompanying text.
5. See Doyel, In Search of a Remedy for the Racially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 385 (1985).
6. 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986).
7. See infra notes 21-60 and accompanying text.
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doctrine. 8 Next, it explores the Court's most recent decision in this
area, Batson v. Kentucky. The article concludes by comparing some impli-
cations of the Batson decision with the sixth amendment approach to
challenging unfair jury selection procedures.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Peremptory Challenge
Prior to The Ordinance for Inquests9 enacted in 1305, the prosecu-
tor had a right in all felony trials to challenge any number ofjurors with-
out cause. The defendant was allowed thirty-five peremptory
challenges. 10 As a result of the Ordinance for Inquests, the king could
challenge no jurors without assigning a cause certain to be tried and
approved by the court. I I Yet the prosecution was not required to assign
cause unless, after standing the jurors aside, 12 there remained a defi-
ciency in the number ofjurors required. This system became the settled
law in England. 13
Since peremptory challenges by the king were abolished in 1305,
today's peremptory challenges by the state are not part of the common
law as adopted from England, but rather are statutorily created. In
1856, the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's right
to stand jurors aside was not part of the adopted common law, and
therefore was applicable in federal courts only if the state in which a
federal court sat extended that right to jurors. 14 The defendant's right
to peremptory challenges in federal cases was codified in 179015 and
was finally extended to all federal prosecutors in 1865.16
Although there is no constitutional right requiring Congress to
grant peremptory challenges to the defendant, 17 the peremptory chal-
lenge has been considered "one of the most important of the rights se-
cured to the accused." 1 8  It provides a way to eliminate those
prospective jurors who the lawyer intuitively believes, but cannot prove,
will be less than impartial.' 9 Thus, while the peremptory challenge itself
8. See infra notes 61-111 and accompanying text.
9. 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305).
10. Peremptory Challenges -Systematic Exclusion, supra note 1, at 158 (citing I E. COKE, A
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON, 156(b) (1st Amer. ed. 1853)).
11. 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305). The defendant retained the privilege of the peremptory
challenge to be used for protection against jurors who appeared to be prejudiced against
him and to allow the defendant to remove a juror whom he had offended by an unsuccess-
ful challenge for cause. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
346-47 (1st ed. 1769).
12. "Standing aside" allowed the prosecution to direct any juror, after voir dire exam-
ination, to stand aside until the entire panel had been examined and the defendant had
exercised his challenges.
13. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213 n.12 (1965).
14. United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. 588, 590 (1856).
15. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119.
16. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500.
17. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
18. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
19. See generally, Younger, Unlauful Peremptory Challenges, 7 LITIGATION 23 (1980) (dis-
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has not been the subject of attack, its discriminatory use to remove pro-
spective jurors on a racial basis has been challenged often over the past
century. 20 The question raised is whether there has been a denial of
constitutional rights by the exclusion of jurors on a racial basis. The
constitutional rights in question are the defendant's fourteenth amend-
ment rights to equal protection of the laws and his sixth amendment
right to trial by an impartial jury.
B. Development of the Equal Protection Analysis
In 1875, Congress enacted a statute making it a crime to exclude
any qualified citizen from a grand or petit jury on the basis of race.
2 1
The Supreme Court upheld the statute on the grounds that such exclu-
sion would violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.2 2 In Strauder v. West Virginia,23 the Supreme Court invalidated a
West Virginia statute which prohibited blacks from serving as jurors.
Basing its decision on the Constitution, the Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment makes no attempt to enumer-
ate the rights it is designed to protect. It speaks in general
terms, and those are as comprehensive as possible. Its lan-
guage is prohibitory; but every prohibition implies the exist-
ence of rights and immunities, prominent among which is an
immunity from inequality of legal protection, either for life, lib-
erty, or property. Any state action that denies this immunity to
a colored man is in conflict with the Constitution.
2 4
Twenty years later, the Court elaborated on this principle of prohibited
state action in Carter v. Texas:
25
Whenever by any action of a State, whether through its
legislature, through its courts, or through its executive or ad-
ministrative officers, all persons of the African race are ex-
cluded, solely because of their race or color, from serving as
grand jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person of the Afri-
can race, the equal protection of the laws is denied to him, con-
trary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.
26
cussing the desirability of preserving challenges and approaching reform of the jury selec-
tion process with caution).
20. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12
N.W.2d 466 (1943), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 749 (1944); Whitney v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. App.
197, 63 S.W. 879 (1901).
21. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336.
22. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
23. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Strauder did not address whether blacks could be excluded
from the jury through peremptory challenges, because no blacks had ever been summoned
to serve on the venire to be challenged. Id. at 310.
24. Id. The protection of Strauder was extended to Mexican-Americans in Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
25. 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
26. Id. at 447 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880); and Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896)). In Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935), the Supreme Court described this paragraph as
"[slumming up precisely the effect of earlier decisions."
1988]
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In Strauder, the Court recognized that the fourteenth amendment
does not require a jury composed in whole or part of persons of the
defendant's race.2 7 A mixed jury in a particular case is not essential to
the equal protection of the laws, 28 but equal protection does guarantee
that a defendant be tried by a jury whose members are summoned pur-
suant to nondiscriminatory criteria.
29
The core of the equal protection notion was later defined as the
idea that jurors "should be selected as individuals, on the basis of indi-
vidual qualifications, and not as members of a race." 30 The fact that jury
competence is an individual matter, rather than a group matter, was felt
to be a cornerstone of the jury system. "To disregard [this principle] is
to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are ab-
horrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury."'
In Swain v. Alabama,32 a black defendant used an equal protection
analysis to challenge a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges
to obtain an all-white jury. Swain is the only United States Supreme
Court decision other than Batson v. Kentucky to address directly the con-
stitutional validity of the racially discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges. A much criticized decision, 33 Swain has resulted in the
elimination of all but two 3 4 equal protection challenges to a prosecu-
tor's alleged discriminatory use of peremptories.
35
Robert Swain, a black man, was indicted, convicted of rape and sen-
tenced to death by an all-white jury. Eight blacks were summoned to the
venire, two were exempt and six were peremptorily struck by the prose-
cutor. No black had served on any other petit jury since approximately
1950.36 Discussing the function of the peremptory challenge, the Court
noted that its use not only eliminated extremes of partiality, but assured
that jurors would decide the case on the basis of the evidence placed
before them. 37 In upholding the right to unqualified peremptories for
both the defendant and the prosecutor, the Court stated "that the sys-
27. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
28. See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 335 (1880).
29. See Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345
(1880).
30. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950).
31. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
32. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
33. See, e.g.,J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT
To REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977); Imlay, FederalJury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Insti-
tution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 247, 269-70 (1973); Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Prac-
tices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10-1 I
(1982); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE
L.J. 1715, 1723-24 & n.36 (1977); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for
the Perpetuation of the All-W1'hite Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1160-75 (1966).
34. See State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d
751 (La. 1979).
35. "[T~he individual defendant is unlikely to have either the time or the resources to
compile and analyze the raw data necessary to [make] a statistical attack on the prosecu-
tion's use of peremptory challenges." United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1317 (8th
Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
36. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
37. Id. at 219.
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tem should guarantee 'not only freedom from any bias against the ac-
cused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between
him and the state the scales are to be evenly held.' "38
The Court in Swain differentiated "challenges for cause," as those
defined on a specified basis, from peremptory challenges, those chal-
lenges exercised "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without
being subject to the court's control."'3 9 In exercising a peremptory chal-
lenge, the attorney does not decide "whether a juror of a particular race
or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is
less likely to be." 40 Under Swain, therefore, jurors could be excused on
the basis of their group affiliation, including race, religion, and
nationality.
4'
The Swain Court held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges in a particular case is immune from constitutional inquiry based
on the equal protection clause. 4 2 The opinion suggested, however, that
statistical evidence establishing a pattern of racial bias by a prosecutor in
a particular jurisdiction, in case after case, regardless of the circum-
stances or severity of the crime, may provide sufficient evidence to es-
tablish a prima facie fourteenth amendment case.43 Swain foreclosed an
equal protection attack on a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
in a single case and erected an insurmountable burden on the defendant
to establish the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges
against blacks over time.
44
The difficulty of overcoming the Swain burden of proof is the result
of a combination of many factors. There are no records regarding the
race of members of the venire, the nature of the challenges, whether
peremptory or for cause, or the party making a particular challenge.
45
Indigent defendants cannot bear the costs of investigation and data de-
velopment4 6 and, since the abuse of peremptory challenges does not
appear until the trial begins, little time is afforded to conduct an investi-
gation.4 7 This departure from basic equal protection ideas prompted
Justice Marshall's campaign for the reconsideration of Swain.
4 8
38. Id. at 220 (quoting Haves v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
39. Id. (citing State v. Thompson, 68 Ariz. 386, 202 P.2d 1037 (1949); Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)).
40. Id. at 220-21 (footnote omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 221-22.
43. Id. at 223. Labeling this burden of proof "Mission Impossible," the Second Cir-
cuit noted that almost no other defendant in two decades had successfully met this stan-
dard of proof. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986).
44. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227.
45. Doyel, supra note 5, at 405.
46. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 263, 583 P.2d 748, 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
893 (1978).
47. Id.
48. See Harris v. Texas, 467 U.S. 1261 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Williams v. Illinois, 466 U.S. 981 (1984) (MarshallJ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963-70 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting
1988]
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C. Further Development of the Equal Protection Analysis as Applied to Jury
Venires
Since Swain, the Court has fully articulated the components of a
prima facie case for an equal protection challenge to a discriminatory
selection of the venire. 49 Justice Blackmun initially set forth these stan-
dards in Castaneda v. Partida.50 The first step is to demonstrate that the
excluded group is one that is "a recognizable, distinct class, singled out
for different treatment under the laws."
5 1 Second, the defendant 5 2
must establish that the group is substantially underrepresented.
53
The essential purpose of the equal protection clause is to prevent
governmental discrimination on the basis of race. 54 But the equal pro-
tection clause requires that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discrimina-
tory purpose." 55 Therefore, underrepresentation alone is not enough
to establish a violation of the equal protection clause. Discriminatory
intent is also required. 56 Intent may be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances in a series of cases or in a single case and may include
proof of disproportionate impact 57 coupled with evidence that the ve-
nire was selected under a system providing an opportunity for discrimi-
nation. 58 Once a prima facie case of discrimination is presented by the
defendant, "the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the pre-
sumption of unconstitutional action by demonstrating that permissible
racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the
monochromatic result."'5 9 The development of the equal protection
analysis has expanded its application to discrimination in each phase of
the jury selection process - the selection of grand juries, jury venires,
and finally to the selection of an individual petit jury.
D. Development of the Sixth Amendment Fair Cross-Section Analysis
Three years after Swain, in Duncan v. Louisiana,60 the Supreme Court
imposed upon the states the sixth amendment requirement ofjury trials
from denial of certiorari). See also Thompson v. United States, 469 U.S. 1024, 1024-27
(1984) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
49. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1721-23 (1986).
50. 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). Although Castaneda involved discrimination with regard
to grand juries, it is based on ajury venire case. See also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954).
51. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494.
52. As in any equal protection case, the burden is on the defendant "to prove the
existence of purposeful discrimination." Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967) (cit-
ing Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519, 520 (1903)).
53. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494. Under this rule of exclusion, once underrepresenta-
tion is shown, a presumption of discrimination arises. Id. at 493.
54. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
55. Id. at 240.
56. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 493.
57. Wl'ashington, 426 U.S. at 266.
58. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. at 552.
59. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972).
60. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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in criminal cases. 6 1 Then, in Taylor v. Louisiana,6 2 the Court interpreted
the sixth amendment to require that the jury venire be selected from a
representative cross-section of the community.6 3 A procedure granting
automatic jury service exemptions to women was invalidated in this case
because it fostered misrepresentation by providing jury venires com-
posed almost totally of men.
6 4
The foundation for the Taylor sixth amendment decision was laid in
a series of equal protection cases beginning nearly thirty-five years ear-
lier with Smith v. Texas. 6 5 Reversing a black defendant's state conviction
based on a violation of the equal protection clause, the Smith Court
stated:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as in-
struments of public justice that the jury be a body truly repre-
sentative of the community. For racial discrimination to result
in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups
not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it
but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society
and a representative government.
66
In Glasser v. United States,67 the Court entertained the question of
whether systematic exclusion from a federal jury venire of all women
who were not members of the League of Women Voters would violate
the sixth amendment. Although the Court rejected the defendants' ar-
gument on the ground of insufficient proof, it reaffirmed the require-
ment of a representative venire. 68
Extending the cross-section principle, the Court, in Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co.,69 reversed a civil judgment because the jury process had sys-
tematically excluded all daily wage earners. Although the guarantee of
an impartial jury did not require that each jury "contain representatives
of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical
groups of the community,"' 70 the Court held that it does require a venire
selected "without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these
groups."
7 1
Reaffirming Thiel in Ballard v. United States,72 the Supreme Court re-
versed the convictions of two defendants because women had been in-
tentionally and systematically excluded from the jury venire. Rejecting
the view that an all male venire summoned from various groups in the
community could be representative, the Ballard Court in an oft-quoted
73
61. Id. at 149.
62. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
63. Id. at 528.
64. Id. at 527.
65. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
66. Id. at 130, quoted in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 527.
67. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
68. Id. at 86.
69. 328 U.S. 217 (1945).
70. Id. at 220.
71. Id.
72. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
73. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 531-32; Booker v.Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 769
1988]
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paragraph stated:
[I]t is not enough to say that women when sitting as jurors
neither act nor tend to act as a class. Men likewise do not act as
a class. But, if the shoe were on the other foot, who would
claim that a jury was truly representative of the community if all
men were intentionally and systematically excluded from the
panel? The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a com-
munity made up exclusively of one is different from a commu-
nity composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence of one
on the other is among the imponderables.
7 4
The Court went on to say that the injury sustained from the systematic
and intentional exclusion of a group is not limited to the defendant but
extends "to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the commu-
nity at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of
our courts."
7 5
In summarizing the collective teachings of the Supreme Court in
Glasser, Thiel and Ballard, the Sixth Circuit 76 recently recognized that
although these cases were decided prior to Duncan, and therefore prior
to the application of the sixth amendment to the states, their principles
have been adopted and developed by the Court's sixth amendment anal-
ysis. 7 7 These three cases demonstrate the use of the court systems' su-
pervisory powers to mitigate racial discrimination in the jury selection
process.
In Peters v. Kif,78 the United States Supreme Court considered a
white defendant's challenge to the systematic exclusion of blacks from
jury service. 79 Based on due process grounds, the Court rejected the
state's contention that because the defendant himself was not black he
was not harmed by the exclusion. Justice Marshall elaborated as follows:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is
excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury
room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experi-
ence, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.
It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will con-
sistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its
exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events
(6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Michigan v. Booker, 106 S.Ct.
3289 (1986); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 756. See also Doyel, supra note 5, at 418-19.
74. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 195.
76. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub
nom. Michigan v. Booker, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986). The principles of these cases, as
presented in Booker are: an impartial jury is a product of methods that do not systematically
exclude members of a distinct group; competence is an individual characteristic; the viola-
tion lies in the exclusionary conduct or policy, not in a bias of a particular jury; and it is the
integrity of the system and the public's right to a representative jury that are impaired. Id.
at 769.
77. Id. at 769.
78. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
79. The Court was unable to entertain the sixth amendment challenge because




that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented.
80
In reviewing the historical progression of the holdings of the series of
cases beginning with Smith, the Taylor cross-section rule explicitly pro-
vides that petit juries need not mirror the community, even though no
distinctive group may be systematically excluded from jury venires. 81
Refining the Taylor decision, Duren v. Missouri 8 2 delineated the stan-
dards for proving a violation of the fair cross-section doctrine with re-
spect to the venire:
[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be
excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group in venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community; and (3) that this under-
representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in
the jury-selection process.
8 3
Discriminatory purpose or intent need not be demonstrated be-
cause it is the disproportionate representation itself which violates the
sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement. Once the defendant
makes a prima facie showing of underrepresentation, the state bears the
burden of showing that a significant state interest is promoted by the
underrepresentation.84
E. State Court Development of the Sixth Amendment Analysis
The Taylor holding applied to the representativeness ofjury venires,
not the composition of the petit jury. Although some commentators
contend that the holding of Taylor should not be applied to limit distor-
tion of the petit jury by peremptory challenges, 85 others argue that the
Court's reasoning compels the rule's extension. 86 Dissatisfied with the
barrier presented by Swain and tempted by the representative cross-sec-
tion approach, some courts have been willing to reexamine the validity
of racially based peremptory challenges.
Circumventing the Swain hurdle, the California Supreme Court ex-
80. Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04 (footnote omitted). Although Peters was based on due
process grounds, the Taylor Court cited Peters for the proposition that to present a claim, a
defendant need not be a member of the group excluded from jury service. Taylor, 419 U.S.
at 526.
81. 419 U.S. at 538.
82. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
83. Id. at 364.
84. Id. at 368.
85. See, e.g., Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality
and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337 (1982); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Per-
emptory Challenge, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 (1985); Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning
of Jury Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177 (1980).
86. See, e.g., J. Van Dyke, supra note 34; Note, People v. Wheeler: Peremptory Challenge
May Not Be Used to Remove Jurors Solely for Group Association, 58 N.C.L. REV. 152 (1979);
Comment, People v. Wheeler, Peremptory Challenges - A \ezw Interpretation, 14 NEw EN. L.
REV. 370 (1978).
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tended the Taylor holding in People v. Wheeler,8 7 by allowing individual
defendants to challenge the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges
on a case-by-case basis. The court equated the requirement that venires
be representative of a cross-section of the community with the impartial-
ity of a petit jury, 88 the theory being that impartiality is to be achieved
through the interaction of varying values and experiences that the jurors
bring from their respective groups.89 To ensure this interaction, the use
of peremptory challenges to eliminate specific bias was held permissible,
but the court felt that elimination of bias based solely upon group affilia-
tion would thwart the primary purpose of the representative cross-sec-
tion requirement. 90
Relying on its state's Declaration of Rights, the Massachusetts court
in Commonwealth v. Soares9 ' followed much the same reasoning as the
Wheeler court. The Soares court adopted the mechanics developed in
Wheeler to enforce the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury. To
overcome a rebuttable presumption that the peremptories were exer-
cised constitutionally, the Court stated, the challenging party must show
"that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group," cou-
pled with a "strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged
because of their group association."-9 2 Unlike Wheeler, Soares identified
those "discrete groups" which cannot be discriminated against.
93
Before the 1978 Wheeler decision, state courts were unanimous in
following the Swain principle.9 4 Though Swain remains the overwhelm-
ing majority rule among the states,9 5 at least five states9 6 and two fed-
eral circuit courts of appeals 97 have recognized alternatives to Swain.
These cases relied at least in part on a representative cross-section anal-
ysis under the sixth amendment to guarantee trial by an impartial jury.
87. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). The
court evaded the conflict with federal law by independently basing its decision on the Cali-
fornia Constitution.
88. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03.
89. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
90. Id. at 278, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
91. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1986).
92. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
93. Soares, 377 Mass. at 461, 387 N.E.2d at 516. Relying on the Massachusetts equal
rights amendment, MASS. CONST. art. 1, § 102 (amended 1976), the court limited applica-
tion of the new rule to groups identified on the basis of sex, race, color, creed or national
origin.
94. See Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude from Jury Persons Belonging to a
Class or Race, 79 A.L.R. 3d 14, 19 (1977).
95. United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 551 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted andjudgment
vacated, 107 S.Ct. 1267 (1987).
96. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); State
v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d
499 (1979); State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389, 489 A.2d 1175 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1985); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (1980).
97. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub
nom. Michigan v. Booker, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986).
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F. Sixth Amendment Analysis as Applied in the Federal Courts
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit to find a
sixth amendment alternative to the Swain approach. In McCray v.
Abrans,9 8 the court of appeals objectionably followed the equal protec-
tion holding of Swain, but found that the Swain decision did not fore-
close a claim brought under the sixth amendment. 99
The court held that each defendant is to have the right to trial by an
impartial jury, which requires each case to be decided on the practices
complained of in that very case.10 0 Adapting the Duren standard to show
a prima facie violation with regard to the venire,' 0lthe Second Circuit
provided the following test to be applied to the petit jury:
[T]he defendant must show that in his case, (1) the group al-
leged to be excluded is a cognizable group in the community,
and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the challenges lead-
ing to this exclusion have been made on the basis of the indi-
vidual venireperson group affiliation rather than because of any
indication of a possible inability to decide the case on the basis
of the evidence presented.'
0 2
The first step is virtually the same as in Duren, exchanging the term
"distinctive group" for "cognizable group," although no explanation or
definition for the term "cognizable group" was provided. Duren's sec-
ond step, showing that underrepresentation in the venire was unreason-
able in relation to the number of such persons in the community,' 0 3 was
omitted altogether. Since disproportionate underrepresentation is the
crux of the fair cross-section rationale, it is puzzling that the Second
Circuit failed to incorporate this step into its test. 10 4 The second factor
of the McCray approach resembles the fourteenth amendment analysis
more than Duren's sixth amendment "systematic exclusion"' 1 5 require-
ment.10 6 Another parallel to the equal protection principle is that once
the burden shifts to the prosecution to rebut the defendant's prima facie
case, the state must show that "permissible racially neutral selection cri-
teria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result."' 10 7
This wording was taken directly from equal protection cases. 10 8
In Booker v. Jabe,10 9 the Sixth Circuit adopted the McCray test for
establishing a prima facie case without questioning its similarity to the
98. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 1124.
100. Id. at 1130-31.
101. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
102. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1131-32.
103. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
104. Doyel, supra note 5, at 429.
105. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
106. Doyel, supra note 5, at 430.
107. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1132 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977),
(quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (quoting Alexander v. Lousiana,
405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972))).
108. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1132. For further discussion see Doyel, supra note 5, at 429-
35.
109. 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985).
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fourteenth amendment cases. 1 0 The court, however, did require that
the challenging party show a "systematic" abuse of peremptory chal-
lenges before the burden would shift to the opposing party.' I1  The
sixth amendment challenge may be asserted successfully by either pros-
ecutor or defense counsel when an unjustifiable systematic exclusion
occurs. 1 12
III. BATSON V. KENTUCKY
A. Facts
James Kirkland Batson, a black man, was tried and convicted by a
Kentucky jury of second degree burglary" 13 and receipt of stolen prop-
erty. 114 At trial, a jury venire was presented and the judge conducted
voir dire examination. 115 After voir dire had been completed and jurors
were excused for cause, the parties exercised their peremptory chal-
lenges."16 Although the venire included four blacks, the prosecutor
used four of his six peremptory challenges 1 7 to produce an all-white
petit jury. Batson timely objected to the state's challenges, moved to
discharge the panel and later objected to the swearing of the jury. Cit-
ing the sixth and fourteenth amendments, he contended that his rights
to an impartial trial by a cross-section of the community and equal pro-
tection of the laws had been violated. The trial court overruled Batson's
objections, reasoning that the actual composition of the petit jury is not
subject to the fair cross-section rule.
On appeal, the petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of per-
emptory challenges had deprived him of a jury drawn from a fair cross-
section of the community. He conceded that Swain v. Alabama fore-
closed an equal protection claim based on the use of peremptories in a
single case and urged the court to depart from Swain and to hold that his
sixth amendment rights had been violated.1 18 He also asserted that the
prosecutor's challenge of all the black veniremen indicated that the chal-
lenges had been exercised solely on the basis of race, establishing an
110. Id. at 773.
111. Id. Both WcCray and Booker have been vacated and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Batson and Allen. See infra note 140. After consideration of Batson and Allen, the
Sixth Circuit reinstated its previous opinion of judgment in Booker v. Jabe, 801 F.2d 871
(6th Cir. 1986).
112. 775 F.2d at 772.
113. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1715 (1986).
114. Id.
115. Id. The trial court may conduct voir dire examination itself or allow counsel to so
do. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.38 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986-87).
116. Each side is given a list of the qualified jurors equal to the number ofjurors to be
seated plus the total number of peremptory challenges allowed to all parties. Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9.36, 9.40 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986-87).
117. In felony trials the prosecutor is allowed five peremptories plus one extra if an
alternate is chosen, and the defense is permitted eight plus the one extra. Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9.40 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986-87).
118. Batson urged the adoption of the decisions in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978) and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461,
387 N.E. 2d 499 (1979).
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equal protection claim under Swain. The Supreme Court of Kentucky
rejected his jury discrimination claim and affirmed the petitioner's con-
viction, declining to depart from the Swain rule.' 19
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Court began its analysis of the defendant's equal protection
claim' 2 0 by reiterating the principles announced over one hundred
years ago in Strauder v. West Virginia.'2 1 Emphasizing that the Strauder
principles never have been questioned, the Court explained it was the
application of those principles to particular facts that compelled re-
peated review.1 22 Looming in these cases is the question of whether the
defendant has sustained his burden of proving purposeful discrimina-
tion. 123 The Court provided a thorough discussion of Swain 124 and re-
affirmed Swain's contention that a "State's purposeful or deliberate
denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the
administration ofjustice violates the Equal Protection Clause."'1 2 5
Describing the Swain burden as "crippling," the Court observed
that the states' use of peremptory challenges is largely protected from
constitutional review. 12 6 The Court then delineated its reasons for re-
jecting the evidentiary standards required by Swain to establish a prima
facie equal protection violation. Drawing from its decisions following
Swain, the Court laid a foundation for extending the equal protection
analysis previously reserved for examining venire selection
violations.127
The Court held that purposeful discrimination in petit jury selec-
tion may be established based solely on evidence concerning the state's
use of peremptories at the defendant's trial. 128 The following condi-
tions were set forth as required elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination:
(1) "the defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable ra-
cial group,"' 12 9 and "that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory chal-
119. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kentucky at 1,James Kirk-
land Batson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 84-SC-733-MR (Ky. Dec. 20, 1984).
120. Though Batson pressed his sixth amendment claim, the Court chose to overlook
that argument and review the case on equal protection grounds. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 141-44.
121. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1716-19 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880)). See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
122. Id. at 1719.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1719-21 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)). See supra notes 33-
49 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 1716 (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04).
126. Id. at 1720.
127. Id. at 1721-22. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
128. Id. at 1722-23.
129. Id. at 1723 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1976)). Whether a
defendant not a member of the excluded group will be able to assert a fourteenth amend-
ment challenge remains to be determined. See also Doyel, supra note 5, at 410. Cf Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (a white has standing to challenge the exclusion of blacks); and
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lenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race;"13 0
(2) "the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can
be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate;' "131
(3) "the defendant must show that these facts and other relevant cir-
cumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race."1
3 2
The Court required that the trial judge consider all relevant circum-
stances in determining whether the defendant had demonstrated a
prima facie case.' 33 Once the requisite showing is made, the burden
shifts to the prosecution to come forward with racially neutral reasons
for excluding non-white veniremen. 134 The Court did not require that
the explanation rise to the level of cause, but held that there must be an
articulable reason other than the assumption the juror will be biased due
to his racial affiliation.1
3 5
Because the trial court refused to make inquiry into the prosecutor's
reasons for his actions, the case was remanded for further proceed-
ings.1 36 The Court directed that if racially neutral explanations could
not be articulated, the defendant's conviction should be reversed.
13 7
C. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice White concurred with the majority, but elected to write sepa-
rately to express his concern with allowing retroactive application of the
Court's decision. ' 38 Justice O'Connor, ' 39 concurring, and ChiefJustice
Burger, dissenting, also advocated foreclosing retroactive
application. 140
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1976) (requiring defendant to show substantial
underrepresentation of his race).
130. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The Court expressed no opinion whether the Constitu-
tion imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptories by defense counsel. Id. at 1718
n.12.





136. Id. at 1725.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1726 (White, J., concurring). Justice White founded his argument on De-
Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (holding that Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), could not be applied retroactively to trials beginning prior to the date of the
Duncan decision).
139. 106 S.Ct. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 1741 (Burger, J., concurring). A 1986 decision, Allen v. Hardy, 106 S.Ct.
2878 (1986) (per curiam) held that the Batson decision could not be applied retroactively
to collateral review of convictions that became final before the Batson opinion was an-
nounced. Final means "the judgment of the conviction was rendered, the availability of
appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed." Allen, 106 S.Ct. at
2880 n.l (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965)). But see Griffith v.
Kentucky, 107 S.Ct. 708, 714 (1987), holding that Batson is to be applied retroactively to
all cases pending on direct review or not yet final at the time of the Batson decision. Griffith
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Justice Marshall, concurring, urged the total abolition of peremp-
tory challenges. He opined that the Batson decision would not end racial
discrimination and that sacrificing the defendant's peremptory chal-
lenges would be a small price to pay to achieve the desired result.
14 1
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, applauded the Court for
deciding the case on an equal protection ground. 14 2 In earlier deci-
sions, 14 3 Justice Stevens had criticized the Court for entertaining argu-
ments not presented in a defendant's petition for certiorari.
144
Justifying his acceptance of the Batson decision, Justice Stevens distin-
guished it based on the appealing party's reliance on the equal protec-
tion issue.
In a weak dissent, ChiefJustice Burger offered historical support for
keeping the peremptory challenge intact and concluded that a pure
equal protection analysis has no application to peremptory challenges
exercised in any particular case.14 5 Dismissing Justice Stevens' explana-
tion, Justice Burger reasoned that since the equal protection claim was
not pressed in either the Kentucky Supreme Court or in the petition to
grant certiorari, the Court had improperly entertained the equal protec-
tion issue. 1
46
Justice Rehnquist felt that the state's use of peremptories to exclude
minorities on the assumption they would be more likely to favor the de-
fendant should be upheld. 147 He dissented from the Court's decision to
overrule this application of the peremptory challenge. He also argued
that the Court offered no support for its decision. 14 8 Justice Rehnquist
continued to rely on the reasoning of the Swain decision, and found that
the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case.1
4 9
overturned the Court's "clear break exception" described in United States v.Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 549-50 (1982), that disallowed retroactive application where a new rule is a
"clean break" with past precedent. 457 U.S. at 549-50.
141. 106 S.Ct. at 1728-29 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall was concerned
that the prosecutor can too easily justify his reason for exercising peremptory strikes.
142. Id. at 1729-30 (Stevens, J., and Brennan, J., concurring).
143. Colorado v. Connelly, 106 S.Ct. 785 (1986) (memorandum of Brennan, J., joined
by Stevens, J.), and New Jersey v. T.L.O, 468 U.S. 1214 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Although Supreme Court Rule 21. 1(a) requires that "[olnly questions set forth in
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court," SuP. CT. R.
21.1 (a), the Court has repeatedly heard cases without briefing or oral argument. See Colo-
rado v. Connelly, 106 S.Ct. 785 (1986); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380. 386 n.3 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214 (1984), Justice Stevens,
dissenting, opined that the adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on
the initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion the questions for
review." 468 U.S. at 1216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1734-41 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1731-34. Justice Burger suggested that when the Court granted certiorari it
could have at least directed the parties to address the equal protection issue or, following
oral argument, directed reargument on the particular question.
147. Id. at 1744-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1745 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
"Challenges for cause obviously have to be explained; by definition,
peremptory challenges do not."' 150 In light of the Batson decision, the
peremptory challenge has been redefined. Never before has the Court
advocated inquiry into the prosecutor's basis for exercising a peremp-
tory strike; but, never before has the Court offered a remedy to end ra-
cial discrimination in petit jury selection.
The Batson Court chose to ignore the defendant's sixth amendment
challenge and instead chose to reexamine a longstanding precedent' 5 1
that offered an unworkable and inadequate cure to racial discrimination
in jury selection procedures. 152 While Batson reaffirmed the principle
that a "State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of
race of participation as jurors in the administration ofjustice violates the
Equal Protection Clause,"1 53 the Court rejected Swain's difficult eviden-
tiary standard regarding whether the defendant had met his burden of
proving intentional discrimination by the state. 154 Batson adopted new
standards, derived from an equal protection analysis, that now afford a
defendant the opportunity to establish purposeful discrimination in se-
lection of the petit jury by relying solely on the facts in his case. 15 5
Although ChiefJustice Burger claimed that an unadulterated equal pro-
tection analysis could not be applied to jury selection in a particular
case,15 6 the majority recognized that judicially created procedures must
give way if a constitutional provision so demands.1
5 7
The Court's standards for establishing a prima facie case were
adapted from the equal protection rationale as applied to jury
venires. 158 Previous decisions indicate that this test has practical appli-
150. Id. at 1739 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
151. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1964).
152. The defendant based his argument on the grounds that the prosecutor's conduct
violated his rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community. The state, however, insisted that the defendant
was claiming a denial of equal protection, thereby urging the Court to base its finding on
Swain. The Court chose to ignore the defendant's argument and agreed with the state that
the defendant's claim was based on equal protection principles. The result was a reexami-
nation of Swain and a side-stepping of the sixth amendment claim. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at
1716 n.4.
Justice Stevens applauded the Court for resolving the issue based on an equal protec-
tion analysis although the defendant failed to present an equal protection argument in his
brief. Justice Stevens justified the Court's decision on the grounds that the state had relied
on these grounds in defending the judgment. Id. at 1729-30 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger stated that review of an equal protection argument is improper be-
cause the defendant expressly declined to raise this issue both in the United State
Supreme Court and in the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Id. at 1731-34 (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
153. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1716 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04
(1965)).
154. Id. at 1720-21. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
155. Id. at 1722. See supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
156. Id. at 1737.
157. Id. at 1724.
158. See supra notes 50-84 and accompanying text.
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cability, 159 but its usefulness in the petit jury context will need to be
determined. The Court's focus on the elimination of racial discrimina-
tion limited the scope of the Batson holding and disposed of the problem
of defining what constitutes a "suspect" or "cognizable" group. 160 This
narrow approach avoids overtaxing the system and stops short of an
analysis which could lead to the demise of the peremptory challenge.
Borrowing from Castaneda v. Partida,1 6 1 the Court appeared to sug-
gest that a defendant who is not a member of the excluded racial group
does not have standing to exert an equal protection challenge to dis-
criminatoryjury selection procedures.16 2 Members of these groups un-
doubtedly form the vast majority of potential jurors who are excluded
for discriminatory reasons, yet arguably where a prosecutor discrimina-
torily exercises his peremptory challenges, non-member defendants are
entitled to protection as well.16 3 As noted in Batson, "the ultimate issue
is whether the state has discriminated in selecting the defendant's ve-
nire."164 Although Batson leaves open the question whether the defend-
ant needs to be a member of the excluded group to raise an equal
protection challenge, it is clear that the sixth amendment cross-section
theory allows one not a member of the underrepresented class to assert
a claim. 1
6 5
In addition to limiting its focus to racial discrimination and limiting
standing by excluding non-member defendants, the Batson Court adopts
standards that make it more difficult for a defendant to prove a prima
facie case. Although the defendant is allowed to rely on the fact "that
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits
159. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. The California courts have encountered few problems
in applying their version of inquiring into a prosecutor's reasons for exercising a strike.
See People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1983).
160. Although discrimination in any form has been a concern of the Court, the major
issue of the fourteenth amendment was to end governmental discrimination on account of
race. By focusing on racial discrimination alone, and avoiding discussion of sex, religion,
nationality or creed as a basis for challenging discrimination, the Court may have limited
the potential field of litigation.
161. 430 U.S. 482 (1976).
162. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 494); see United
States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 552-53 n.17 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[tlhe sixth amendment allows
one not a member of the underrepresented class to complain .... while this result is, or at
least was, less clear under the equal protection clause."). Compare Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 494 ("[t]he defendant must show ... substantial underrepresentation of his
race .... ) with Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (a white has standing to challenge the
exclusion of blacks). For a contrary analysis, see Comment, Batson v. Kentucky: Can the
"New" Peremptory Challenge Survive the Resurrection of Strauder v. West Virginia, 20 AKRON L.
REV. 355, 361-62 (1986) (Batson provides support for extending equal protection to areas
other than race).
163. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672
F.2d 1380 (11 th Cir. 1982) (male hispanic entitled to challenge exclusion of blacks and
women from serving as grand jury foreman).
164. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
165. Batson notes that discrimination harms not only the defendant, but also the ex-
cluded juror, and undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system. Id. at 1718.
If a non-member defendant is unable to challenge a discriminatory selection process, the
injury inflicted on the juror and the community is not addressed.
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'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate,' ",166 Batson
requires a defendant to show that the facts and circumstances raise an
inference that the state has exercised its peremptory challenges to ex-
clude veniremen on account of their race.16 7 In contrast, a sixth amend-
ment approach does not require a showing of discrimination because it
is the underrepresentation due to systematic exclusion of a group that is
the focus of a fair cross-section analysis. 168 In both approaches, once a
prima facie case is made out, the burden shifts to the state to come for-
ward with a neutral explanation for challenging the excluded jurors.
169
Such explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause.
170
The Court delineated the standards for assessing and rebutting a prima
facie case, however, it failed to provide procedures for the rule's imple-
mentation, relying on the state and federal trial courts to develop their
own.
17 1
The Court's silence as to the defendant's sixth amendment argu-
ment leaves unclear the question whether a sixth amendment challenge
to racially discriminatory use of peremptories is now foreclosed. Subse-
quently, however, the Court, resting on Batson, chose to vacate and re-
mand for further consideration two cases 17 2 which challenged the Court
to accept the sixth amendment approach. If nothing else, the Court has
bided time before this issue will be settled. 1
7 3
166. Id. at 1723 (citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 82-84.
169. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (citing McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1132 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986) and Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d
762, 773 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub noma. Michigan v. Booker, 106
S.Ct. 3289 (1986)). Although these two cases are sixth amendment cases, they borrowed
the facially neutral explanation criteria directly from an equal protection case, Castaneda
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). This prosecutor's burden is not as demanding as
Duren's rebuttal burden that the underrepresentation further a significant state interest.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369 (1979).
170. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. By inquiring into a prosecutor's reasons for exercising
his peremptory challenges, the Court presumes to provide a vehicle for eliminating dis-
crimination in the jury selection process, yet it is doubtful that this alone can substantially
curb purposeful discrimination. It very likely will result in a more thoughtful and careful
voir dire by the prosecution, coupled with clever notetaking. It is hard to imagine that it
would be difficult to espouse racially neutral explanation for exercising multiple peremp-
tory challenges.
171. Id. at 1724, 1725-26 (White, J., concurring) ("much litigation will be required to
spell out the contours of the Court's Equal Protection holding today .... "). For applica-
tion of the Batson rule, see United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1987); Clay v.
State, 290 Ark. 54, 716 S.W.2d 751 (1986); and Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132
(Wyo. 1986).
172. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub
nom. Michigan v. Booker, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 106 S.Ct. 3289 (1986); see supra note 110.
173. The sixth amendment challenge continues to be asserted following the B-atson de-
cision. See Fields v. People, No. 84-SC-382 (Colo. Feb. 17, 1987) (holding that a prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges to systematically exclude Spanish-surnamed persons
from a jury violates a defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury guaranteed by the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution and article II, section 16 of the Colorado
Constitution; defendant's rights were not violated in this case); see also State v. Gilmore,




Batson v. Kentucky provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity
to overrule its overbearing decision in Swain. As a result, a defendant
may now establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the
state's use of peremptory challenges in a single case. There is nojustifi-
cation for the Court's delay in overruling this holding. For over one
hundred years the Supreme Court has said that the courts are not to
discriminate, but until this decision no viable remedy has been provided.
Whether Batson relieves racial discrimination remains to be seen. Once
the inference of discrimination is raised, creative iawyering may provide
the prosecution with a means to rebut the defendant's claim.
Nevertheless, through the Batson decision, the Court, by denounc-
ing the exercise of peremptories on racial grounds, has taken a giant
step in effectuating a cure. The Court could further emphasize its stand
on eliminating racial discrimination by entertaining the sixth amend-
ment challenge and upholding that approach to curbing discriminatory
selection procedures. 174 If the approaches that have been developed
are not upheld and do not provide the necessary criteria for preventing
racial discrimination injury selection, the result could be the demise of
"one of the most important rights secured to the accused,"' 1 75 the per-
emptory challenge.
Mitzi Grove Ball
challenges to exclude all black prospective petit jurors violated the defendant's constitu-
tional right to an impartial jury).
174. See Note, The Death Knell of the Insurmountable Burden.- Batson v. Kentucky, 31 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 473 (1987).
175. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
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